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The Contractual Obligations of a Successor
Employer under Title I of the Labor
Management Relations Act'
When the employees of an enterprise within the jurisdiction of the
Labor Management Relations Act 2 (LMRA) are organized prior to the
sale of the business, a new owner, if deemed a successor employer by
the National Labor Relations Board (Board) has certain obligations
that may not have been incorporated into the purchase agreement.
These "extra" obligations emanate from the Board's "successorship
doctrine." The doctrine has no precise definition. It is a combination
of Board rulings and decisions that evaluate the impact of a change of
ownership in the employing unit on the rights of employers and em-
ployees under Title I of the LMRA.
The successorship doctrine imposes two general types of obligations
on a successor employer-those of a contractual nature and those con-
cerned with the duty to bargain. This comment will deal with the
contractual obligations of a successor employer under Title I of the
LMRA. Material will be included concerning the determination of
successor status and the bargaining obligation it imposes to the extent
that background information is necessary.
Disputes involving contractual obligations usually arise when a previ-
ous owner (predecessor employer) and an employees' bargaining repre-
sentative have negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that has
not, by its terms, expired prior to the change of ownership. The suc-
cessor employer, who did not assume, nor was a party to the agreement,
may think he is not bound to follow its terms. Prior to the Supreme
Court decision in NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.,8
there were two theories used by the Board, to impose on the successor
employer obligations derived from this collective bargaining agreement.
Both these theories had their origin in the duty to bargain.4
1. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). Title I of the Labor Management Relations Act is the
National Labor Relations Act, Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 as amended
and supplemented by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970),
and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
3. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). Respondent was formerly known as the William J. Burns Inter-
national Detective Agency, Inc.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970). This section is commonly referred to as section 8(a)(5).
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The first theory looked to the successor's unilateral conduct of chang-
ing terms and conditions of employment without bargaining to impasse
with the employees' representative. The Board reasoned the successor's
terms and conditions of employment were to be defined as the status
quo immediately prior to the change of ownership. A successor em-
ployer, like any other employer, violated section 8(a)(5)5 of the LMRA
by unilaterally changing any term or condition of employment without
first bargaining to impasse.6 To remedy7 the section 8(a)(5) violation,
the Board ordered the successor employer to reinstate the status quo
prior to the change of ownership and to "make whole" its employees
for any losses they suffered by reason of the unilateral changes.8 If a
collective bargaining agreement between the predecessor employer and
the employees' bargaining representative was in effect prior to the
change of ownership, a reinstatement of the status quo would indirectly
compel a successor to honor the agreement, at least until he had bar-
gained to impasse.
The second theory looked to the successor's refusal to abide by the
collective bargaining agreement. Prior to the decision in William J.
Burns International Detective Agency, Inc.," the Board had held that a
successor employer was not bound to honor the pre-existing collective
bargaining agreement between the predecessor and the employees' bar-
gaining representative unless he had specificially assumed the obligations
of the agreement.10 In the Burns decision the Board announced this
rule was to be changed. Thereafter, it was the position of the Board that
a successor employer "stood in the shoes" of the predecessor and was
5. Section 8(a)(5) provides that: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employ-
ees ..
6. An employer's unilateral act of changing proper subjects of bargaining before
impasse in negotiations has been held to be a per se refusal to bargain regardless of his
subjective intent. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). This rule was extended to suc-
cessor employers in Overnite Transp. Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966), enforced, 372 F.2d
765 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967).
7. The Board issues remedial orders pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970), commonly
referred to as section 10(c). The section in its pertinent part provides:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue
and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
of this subchapter . . ..
8. Overnite Transp. Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1185, 1192 (1966), enforced, 372 F.2d 765 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967).
9. 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970), enforced in part, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 406 U.S.
272 (1972).
10. Rohlik, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1242 n.15 (1964).
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bound, in the absence of unusual circumstances, to honor and maintain
the pre-existing collective bargaining agreement as though he were a
signatory thereto. This ruling became known as the Burns rule. The
Board reasoned that a successor's failure to maintain the agreement was
"in effect" a violation of sections 8(d)'1 and 8(a)(5) of the LMRA. To
remedy the section 8(a)(5) violation, the successor was ordered to abide
by the agreement.12 Unlike the unilateral change before impasse theory,
a successor employer, under the Burns rule, was compelled to directly
honor a pre-existing collective bargaining agreement.
The mere fact there has been a change of ownership in a business
does not automatically deem the new employer a "successor." Before so
labeling the new employer, the Board looks to the employing industry.
If it has remained "essentially the same"' 3 after the change of owner-
ship, the new employer is found to be a "successor." The Board has
attempted to provide guidelines for the application of this test by
developing a checklist which includes certain factors that are considered
when deciding if an industry has remained "essentially the same." The
questions asked are:
(1) [W]hether there has been a substantial continuity of the same
business operations; (2) whether the new employer uses the
same plant; (3) whether he has the same or substantially
the same work force; (4) whether the same jobs exist under the
same working conditions; (5) whether he employs the same
11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). The section defines the bargaining obligation of the
employer and the labor organization under sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) respectively. It
provides in part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession:
PROVIDED, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering
employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall
also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract ....
12. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350.
13. Valleydale Packers, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1486, 1490 (1967), enforced, 402 F.2d 769
(5th Cir. 1968). Incidental variations in the phrasing of this test include: Is the business,
after the change in ownership "substantially the same employment enterprise" as that
carried on by the predecessor? Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 124, 126, enforced,
419 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1969); and Is there a "substantial continuity of identity" in the
employing industry after the change of ownership? DIT-MCO, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 1458,
1462 (1968), enforced, 428 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1970).
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supervisors; (6) whether he uses the same machinery, equip-
ment, and methods of production; and (7) whether he manu-
factures the same product or offers the same services.1
4
The number of possible variations in the application of the checklist
means that no single response can be determinative of successor status.
Certain factors on the checklist, however, are weighed more heavily
than others. In G.T. & E. Data Services Corp.,15 a trial examiner con-
cluded the employing industry had not remained "essentially the same"
by placing significant weight on the fact that the new employer had
substantially different business objectives from those of the predecessor.
The Board reversed saying:
The basic error in the Trial Examiner's conclusion arises, in our
view, from a misreading of the Board's "employing industry" con-
cepts. In defining and applying the "employing industry" concepts,
the Board with court approval, has always found that more signifi-
cant weight should be attached to facts demonstrative of "the
continued nature of the employment" (of a particular group of
employees involved) rather than to the source of such employ-
ment.""
The focus on the employing industry from the viewpoint of employee
continuity is consistent with Board precedent.17 It has been established
policy that the key factors in determining whether a change in the
employing industry has occurred are those factors that reflect upon the
employees' desire for continued representation by the established bar-
gaining representative.' 8 The one factor to which the Board has paid
particular attention is the degree of re-employment of the predecessor's
employees.1 9 The Board's inquiry with respect to this factor is whether
the new employer has the same, or substantially the same, work force.
It has been indicated that the crucial fact to be evaluated is not so
14. Address by Board Member John H. Fanning, Annual Convention of the State Bar
of Texas, Labor Law Section, July 7, 1967. The address was titled "The Purchaser and
the Labor Contract-An Escalating Theory" and is published in 1967 BNA LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK 284, 286. For an application of the checklist to a specific factual situation
see J-P Mfg., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 79 L.R.R.M. 1216 (1972).
15. 194 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 79 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1971).
16. 79 L.R.R.M. at 1035.
17. See Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 124, enforced, 419 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir.
1969), where the new employer was found to be a successor even though there was no
transfer of assets between him and the predecessor employer. See also Zayre Corp., 170
N.L.R.B. 1751, enforced, 424 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1970), where a new employer, who intro-
duced a more integrated, national management to replace localized, autonomous control
was deemed a successor.
18. Ranch-Way, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 74 L.R.R.M. 1389, 1391 (1970).
19. See J-P Mfg., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 79 L.R.R.M. 1216, 1218-19 (1972).
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much the number of the predecessor's employees that the new employer
hires, but rather, the percentage of employees in the new employer's
work force that were employees of the predecessor.20 Similar working
conditions, job functions, and supervisory hierarchy have also been
found to be indications of the employees' desire for continued repre-
sentation by the established bargaining representative. 21
The Board's emphasis on the employees' desire for continued repre-
sentation is not unusual in view of the bargaining obligation imposed
on an employer if he is deemed a successor. A successor employer must
assume the predecessor's obligation to bargain with the employees'
majority representative. An unexcused failure to honor this obligation
is violative of section 8(a)(5) of the LMRA, and an order requiring the
successor to bargain with the representative is a proper remedy. The
only lawful excuse a successor can have for refusing to bargain is a good
faith doubt of the representative's continuing majority status. The
mere change of ownership, however, cannot by itself create such doubt.22
For purposes of explanation assume the following hypothetical. A
business is sold by employer A to employer B. On the date of transfer
employer A terminates all employer-employee relationships. Employer
B hires the entire employee complement of employer A and these em-
ployees constitute his entire work force. No changes are made in the
operations of the business. Eighteen months before the change of own-
ership the employees of employer A conducted a plant-wide election in
which union X was elected and certified as the exclusive representative
of all the employees. After the change of ownership, union X makes a
demand for collective bargaining upon employer B. Employer B refuses
because no showing has been made to him that union X has continued
to enjoy majority status after the change of ownership. Union X files an
unfair labor practice charge against employer B.
Except for the fact that the employees are now paid by a new em-
ployer, the employing industry has remained the same after the change
of ownership. Thus, in all probability, employer B would be deemed a
successor. Not having shown any evidence of a good faith doubt as to
union X's majority status, B would be held in violation of section
8(a)(5) of the LMRA and ordered to bargain with the union. The find-
ing of a section 8(a)(5) violation creates a possible conflict with section
20. Id.; Hecker Mach., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 81 L.R.R.M. 1253, 1255 (1972).
21. J-P Mfg., Inc., 194'N.L.R.B. No. 161, 79 L.R.R.M. 1216, 1220 (1972).
22. Rohlik, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1964).
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9(a)23 of the LMRA. Under section 8(a)(5) an unfair labor practice is
found only when the employer refuses to bargain collectively with the
employees' representative, subject to the provisions of section 9(a). That
section provides that representatives for collective bargaining purposes
are "[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining by the majority of the employees .... ." A reading of
section 8(a)(5) in conjunction with section 9(a) thus shows that a succes-
sor's refusal to bargain with a bargaining representative can be an un-
fair labor practice only if such representative enjoyed majority status at
the time of the refusal. In the hypothetical, a majority of the employees
had in fact selected a bargaining representative. But this was done
eighteen months prior to the change of ownership and the successor's
refusal to bargain. Whether that bargaining representative actually
enjoyed majority status at the time of the successor's refusal to bargain
is a question that the Board's successorship doctrine does not answer.
The Board justifies its avoidance of the question by making the assump-
tion that when the employing industry remains the same, the em-
ployees' desire for continued representation is not changed by the mere
change of ownership. 24 This assumption is an extension of both Board
and congressional policy that bargaining relationships, once established,
should be protected.25
II
The Board, as early as 1938, has been faced with problems involving
a change of ownership in a business enterprise in which employees were
organized. In these early cases the Board focused on the relationship
between the buyer and seller. If a business was sold to an entity for
the purpose of avoiding a seller's bargaining obligation and the pur-
chasing entity was in fact organized by the seller as a device to achieve
this end, the seller was held to have committed a section 8(a)(5) unfair
23. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
24. Downtown Bakery Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1352 (1962), enforced in part, 330 F.2d 921
(6th Cir. 1964).
25. Section 9(c)(3) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970), provides that: "No election
shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which, in the pre-
ceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held." A bargaining repre-
sentative certified pursuant to section 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970), is thus assured
of a twelve month period during which even a loss of majority status cannot lead to an
ouster or a lawful refusal to bargain by an employer. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
After the certification year has run, a presumption of continuing majority status must
be overcome before the bargaining representative can be challenged. Laystrom Mfg. Co.,
151 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1965).
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labor practice. He was ordered to bargain with the employees' bargain-
ing representative. 26 This holding was based on an alter ego theory. The
purchasing entity was viewed as a mere instrumentality or agent of the
seller, and the seller, as its principal, was directed to order it to bargain
with the employees' representative. Any attempt by the entity to dissi-
pate the representative's majority status by refusing to rehire the
seller's work force was held to be discrimination on the part of the
seller and was proscribed under the same alter ego theory.27
Successorship language first appeared in the Board's decision in
Charles Cushman Co.28 For a valid business reason, a subsidiary corpo-
ration, after having been asked to recognize a union, sold its assets and
transferred its employees to a newly formed subsidiary. The new sub-
sidiary was found to be a successor and held to be under a duty to
recognize and bargain with the union. The Cushman holding was
significant because, unlike earlier cases, the change of ownership was
not accomplished for purposes of avoiding a bargaining obligation. The
Board concluded this distinction was unimportant where the change of
ownership was merely nominal.29
The Board's focus on the relationship between the buyer and seller,
in making a successor status determination, left unresolved the problem
of a transfer of ownership to a bona fide transferee, i.e., a buyer acting
in good faith with no connection or ties to the seller. It was not long,
however, before the Board looked beyond the buyer-seller relationship
to concentrate on the employing industry. The shift of attention to the
employing industry followed the rationale of NLRB v. Colten.30 It was
therein stated:
It is the employing industry that is sought to be regulated and
brought within the corrective and remedial provisions of the Act
in the interest of industrial peace .... It needs no demonstration
that the strife which is sought to be averted is no less an object of
legislative solicitude when contract, death, or operation of law
brings about change of ownership in the employing agency.31
The Board's new approach to change of ownership problems resolved
the bona fide transferee question. Where there was no substantial
26. Hopwood Retinning Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 922, modified & enforced, 98 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1938).
27. Id. at 934-35.
28. 15 N.L.R.B. 90 (1939).
29. Id. at 102.
30. 105 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1939).
31. Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
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change in the employing industry, even a bona fide transferee was held
to have inherited the transferor's bargaining obligation.32
Although the Board was willing to look beyond the buyer-seller rela-
tionship in making a successorship determination, it would not simi-
larly broaden its outlook on other matters related to change of owner-
ship problems. It refused, for example, to extend a bargaining obliga-
tion to the extent that contractual obligations were imposed.3 3 Thus,
a pre-existing collective bargaining agreement of a predecessor was to
be imposed only if the successor had specifically assumed itY4
The Supreme Court in 1964 decided John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Liv-
ingston,35 a case brought under section 30136 of the LMRA. Although
section 301 is not within Title I of the LMRA, and, therefore, not sub-
ject to Board jurisdiction, what the Court said has had great impact on
Board proceedings. In Wiley, a publishing company merged with a
larger, successor publishing company. A number of the merging com-
pany's employees were hired by the successor. Prior to the merger a
portion of the merging company's employees had been organized into a
union and a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration
clause had been executed. This agreement had not expired as of the
merger date. The union claimed that the change of ownership did not
change its representative status regarding employees who had been pre-
viously represented and who had retained their jobs. It also claimed
that the successor was bound by the pre-existing collective bargaining
agreement, as least sufficiently to require him to arbitrate claims con-
cerning certain vested employee rights. When the successor refused to
comply with the union's demands, the union instituted a breach of
contract action pursuant to section 301 to compel the successor to arbi-
trate the effects of the merger on the pre-existing bargaining agreement.
The Court held that a change of ownership did not automatically ter-
minate all rights of the employees under the agreement, and that ".
32. Simmons Eng'r Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1373, 1377 (1946); South Carolina Granite Co., 58
N.L.R.B. 1448, 1462-63 (1944), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F.2d
25 (4th Cir. 1945).
33. Cruse Motors, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 242, 248 (1953).
34. Rohlik, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1964).
35. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
-36. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Section 301 is under Title III of the LMRA. It provides in
part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
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in appropriate circumstances, present here, the successor employer may
be required to arbitrate with the union under the agreement."3
In setting aside the successor's contention that it was not a signatory
to the agreement and therefore not bound by contract law to honor the
arbitration provision, the Court relied on Textile Workers Union of
America v. Lincoln Mills.38 It was therein held that the substantive law
applicable to section 301 suits was federal law derived from the policy
considerations of the national labor laws. 9 In order to determine the
mandates of this federal law as applied to the facts in Wiley, the Court
balanced the right of owners to arrange their business, and even elimi-
nate themselves as employers, against the need for employee protection
in the face of a sudden change in the employment relationship. The
Court, in striking this balance, recognized that arbitration avoids indus-
trial strife and thereby plays a central role in national labor policy.
Unable to find any compelling consideration to counterbalance the
importance of arbitration, the Court concluded the successor had to
arbitrate the effects of the merger on the pre-existing collective bargain-
ing agreement. 40
Two aspects of the Wiley decision left unclear the significance to
Board proceedings of its holding. First, the union did not seek a judg-
ment on the merits of its earlier claim that the successor was bound
per se to all the terms of the bargaining agreement; and secondly, the
Court specifically disclaimed any opinion as to Board proceedings.41 In
view of these limitations, Wiley can be read simply as a logical exten-
sion of the Court's current reliance on arbitration as a means of effectu-
ating national labor policy.42 As such, its only value is precedent in the
development of the "federal law" in section 301 suits. The Board
37. 376 U.S. at 548.
38. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
39. Id. at 456.
40. 376 U.S. at 549-50.
.41. Id. at 551.
42. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960), where the Court compared arbitration under an ordinary commercial con-
tract with arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. It was therein noted:
. . . the choice is between the adjudication of cases or controversies in courts with
established procedures or even special statutory safeguards on the one hand and the
settlement of them in the more informal arbitration tribunal on the other. In the
commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here arbitration is the
substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite different
functions from arbitration under an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility
evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no place here.
For arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and
parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.
Id. at 578.
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indicated in Overnite Transportation Co.,45 however, that Wiley would
in fact have an impact on its proceedings involving a change of owner-
ship. It was the Overnite decision which developed the first theoretical
basis for the Board's imposition of contractual obligations on a suc-
cessor employer.
In Overnite, the Board reasoned that Wiley, at the very least, was
authority for the extension to a successor of its previously enunciated
rule that an employer had to first bargain to impasse with the employ-
ees' bargaining representative before unilateral changes in terms and
conditions of employment could be made.44 The Board's rationale for
this extension incorporates language from Wiley:
Although the Union had tried to protect the employees' post-
takeover interests by its pretakeover bargaining with the seller and
its pretakeover efforts to deal with the purchaser, its efforts with
the purchaser were nullified by Overnite's refusal to recognize and
bargain with it until after Overnite unilaterally changed the very
wages, hours, and working conditions the Union was trying to
protect and was then bargaining with the seller about .... Under
these circumstances the objectives of national labor policy require
that "the rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange
their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be
balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden
change in the employment relationship."
The only protective balancing that is available in the present
situation is that the employees be given the protection and assis-
tance of collective bargaining before the change in corporate
ownership is permitted to alter their economic relationship with
their employer.45
As a result of the Board's decision, a successor employer, upon the
takeover of a business was bound to maintain the status quo as it
existed prior to the change of ownership until he had first bargained
to impasse with the employees' bargaining representative. By means of
a successor's obligation to bargain, the Board imposed upon a successor
employer, for a period of time, the predecessor's terms and conditions
of employment.
The Board decision in Overnite did not go so far as to impose per se
43. 157 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966), enforced, 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
838 (1967).
44. Id. at 1190. The rule as it applies to an ordinary employer was first enunciated by
the Board in Benne Katz, 126 N.L.R.B. 288 (1960), enforcement denied, 289 F.2d 700 (2d Cir.
1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
45. Id. at 1189-90 (emphasis added).
388
Comments
a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement on a successor employer.
Whether or not such an imposition could be made was an issue that the
Board was able to avoid in Overnite because a pre-existing collective
bargaining agreement had not been in effect prior to the change of
ownership. Although the Board's General Counsel immediately raised
this issue in cases46 subsequent to Overnite, the Board did not squarely
face it until 1970 when William J. Burns International Detective
Agency, Inc.,47 and three companion cases48 were decided.
III
The facts in Burns show that the Wackenhut Corporation (Wacken-
hut) performed plant protection services for the Lockheed Aircraft
Service Company (Lockheed). Before its contract with Wackenhut ex-
pired, Lockheed invited bids from other protection service contractors.
At a pre-bid conference attended by the William J. Burns Detective
Agency (Bums) and several other protection service contractors, Lock-
heed advised bidders that the United Plant Guards (Plant Guards) had
been recently certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for all
full and part-time guards employed by Wackenhut at the Lockheed
facility. It also gave notice that Wackenhut and the Plant Guards had
agreed to a collective bargaining agreement, which expired after the
termination date of the employment contract between Lockheed and
Wackenhut. Lockheed awarded the service contract to Burns. The pro-
tection service to be provided by Bums was basically the same as that
provided by Wackenhut.
Bums hired a total of forty-two guards. Twenty-seven of these guards
had been Wackenhut employees at the Lockheed facility. In its pre-
takeover hiring, Bums assisted a rival union by soliciting membership
from prospective employees and later by recognizing the rival union as
the bargaining representative for its work force at Lockheed. The
Plant Guards demanded that Bums recognize it as the sole bargaining
representative for all guards employed at the Lockheed facility. A de-
mand was also made that Burns honor the collective bargaining agree-
46. Michaud Bus Lines, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 193 (1968); Valleydale Packers, Inc., 162
N.LR.B. 1486 (1967).
47. 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970), enforced in part, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 406
U.S. 272 (1972).
48. Travelodge Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 370 (1970); Kota Div. of Dura Corp., 182 N.L.R.B.
360 (1970); Hackney Iron & Steel Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 357 (1970).
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ment that had been in existence prior to the award to Burns of the
service contract. When these demands were rejected the Plant Guards
filed unfair labor practice charges against Burns. The Board found that
Burns was a successor employer and was under a section 8(a)(5) duty to
bargain with the Plant Guards. It further found that Burns violated
section 8(a)(5) by refusing to abide by the pre-existing collective bar-
gaining agreement between Wackenhut and the Plant Guards.49
The Board relied on the Wiley case. It reasoned that the Supreme
Court's refusal to apply contract doctrine to resolve the Wiley issue
altered the perspective from which to view a successor's obligation to
honor a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. The mere fact
that a successor was not a signatory to the agreement was no longer
determinative of the section 8(a)(5) issue.50 The de-emphasis of contract
doctrine was a complete turnabout from the Board's pre-Wiley deci-
sions.51 Wiley's influence on the Board is reflected in the statement of
the issue in Burns:
The question before us thus narrows to whether the national labor
policy embodied in the Act requires the successor employer to take
over and honor a collective bargaining agreement negotiated on
behalf of the employing enterprise by the predecessor.52
In resolving this issue, the Board emphasized the role of collective
bargaining agreements in the stabilization of labor relations and the
prevention of industrial strife. It concluded that these policy considera-
tions favored the preservation of pre-existing collective bargaining
agreements and that they were not outweighed by the fact that a succes-
sor had not been a signatory to the agreement.53 The Board felt the
implementation of its holding, i.e., ordering Burns to honor the pre-
existing agreement between Wackenhut and the-Plant Guards, created
no conflict with the section 8(d) prohibition. Section 8(d), in this con-
text, provides that the section 8(a)(5) bargaining duty is not to be
construed as mandating that an employer agree to proposals or make
concessions. The Board found that the section 8(d) prohibition was not
applicable to the successorship problem posed in Burns because there
49. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350. Violations of sections 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970) and
8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970) were also found but are not relevant to this paper.
50. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350.
51. Rohlik, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1242 n.15 (1964); Cruse Motors, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B.
242, 248 (1953).
52. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350 (emphasis added).
53. Id.
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was an agreement in effect within the employing industry.5 4 It further
found no inequity resulted from the imposition of this agreement upon
a successor. In a change of ownership situation, a successor employer,
unlike employees, can protect himself by making adjustments in the
negotiation of the purchase agreement.5 5 Considering all these factors,
the Board concluded:
Burns is bound to that contract as if it were a signatory
thereto, and that its failure to maintain the contract in effect is
violative of Sections 8(d) and 8(a)(5) of the Act.56
By finding a successor's refusal to comply with a predecessor's bar-
gaining agreement a section 8(a)(5) violation, the Board extended the
successorship doctrine to its furthest extreme. Where a collective bar-
gaining agreement was part of the pre-transfer status quo, the Overnite
approach had only gone so far as to impose the terms and conditions
of the agreement until the successor bargained to impasse. Implicit in
the Overnite rule was the right of a successor to make changes after
impasse had been reached. The Burns rule took this right away from a
successor.
Strict liability was not created for the successor who refused to honor
the pre-existing collective bargaining agreement of the predecessor.
The Board made it clear the Burns rule was applicable only "in the
absence of unusual circumstances." This qualification was applied in
three subsequent Board decisions.5 7 An analysis of these decisions indi-
cates that unusual circumstances will be found where a particular fac-
tual situation does not support the foundation upon which the Burns
rule stood. For example, when a particular governmental ruling pre-
vents a successor from taking into account the effects of a pre-existing
collective bargaining agreement in his contract negotiations, no com-
pliance with the pre-existing agreement is required. A successor will
prevail in this situation because the successor could not possibly have
protected himself by making adjustments in the purchase price. 8
The Board's decision in Burns also had an effect on a successor's
bargaining obligation. As discussed above, a successor employer has a
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. G.T. & E. Data Servs. Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 79 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1971); Em-
erald Maintenance, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1971); Davenport In-
sulation, Inc., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 74 L.R.R.M. 1726 (1970).
58. See Emerald Maintenance, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1971).
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duty to bargain with the employees' majority representative. This duty
exists unless the successor asserts a good faith doubt of the representa-
tive's majority status. There are times, however, when a good faith
doubt of majority status cannot be asserted. If a majority representative
has been certified following a Board-conducted election, such doubt, in
the absence of unusual circumstances, cannot be asserted for a period
of one year following the certification. 9 When a collective bargaining
agreement has been executed, the Board's contract bar doctrine pro-
vides that in the absence of unusual circumstances, an employer cannot
challenge the representative's majority status for a period in which the
agreement bars a question of representation. Agreements for a definite
term, up to three years, bar a question of representation for that period.
Agreements for terms longer than three years are treated as three-year
agreements and will bar a question of representation for three years.60
Prior to the Burns decision, a successor employer who did not assume
the pre-existing agreement, was precluded from challenging the ma-
jority status of the representative only during the certification period.6'
This was one year. After Burns, the Board held that the contract bar
doctrine would be applied to a successor. He was to be precluded
from challenging the representative's majority status for the period
of time in which the agreement was a bar.62
The Burns rule met with mixed reaction from the courts.63 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed Burns to the extent
that it required a successor to honor the pre-existing collective bar-
gaining agreement. 64 Despite the Second Circuit reversal, the Board
indicated in Sacramento Automotive Association65 it would continue
to apply the Burns rule in change of ownership cases. Prior to the
59. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970).
60. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962).
61. The contract bar doctrine applied to a successor only if he assumed the pre-existing
collective bargaining agreement. In addition, such an assumption had to be expressed in
writing. MV Dominator, 162 N.L.R.B. 1514, 1516 (1967).
62. Ranch-Way, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 74 L.R.R.M. 1389 (1970). The Board
therein held:
• . . the normal presumption of union majority status which attaches during the
term of a contract executed by the predecessor employer applies equally to its suc-
cessor, and that the successor employer may not during the life of the contract, assert
a doubt as to its obligation to bargain with the incumbent union.
74 L.R.R.M. at 1392.
63. The Board enforces an order by petitioning a United States court of appeals pur-
suant to section 10(e). 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970). A person aggrieved by a final order of
the Board may seek review in a United States court of appeals pursuant to section 10(f).
29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
64. 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971).
65. 193 N.L.R.B. No. 117, 78 L.R.R.M. 1334, 1336 n.8 (1971).
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Supreme Court's decision in Burns, only the Tenth Circuit had ruled
in favor of the application of the Burns rule while both the Second
and Sixth Circuits refused to apply it.66
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Burns International Security Ser-
vices, Inc.67 reversed the Board's decision and refused to apply the
Burns rule. The Court concluded Burns had a duty to bargain with
the Plant Guards, 68 but from such duty it did not follow that Burns
was obligated to honor the substantive terms and conditions of the
pre-existing collective bargaining agreement:
... in a variety of circumstances involving a merger, stock ac-
quisition, reorganization, or assets purchase, the Board might
properly find as a matter of fact that the successor had assumed
the obligations under the old contract. Such a duty does not,
however, ensue as a matter of law from the mere fact that an
employer is doing the same work in the same place with the
same employees as his predecessor, as the Board had recognized
until its decision in the instant case. We accordingly set aside the
Board's finding of a § 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice insofar as it
rested on a conclusion that Burns was required to but did not
honor the collective-bargaining contract executed by Wackenhut. 69
The Court's rationale notes the Burns rule violates the fundamental
theme of Title I that there be compulsion of bargaining but not com-
pulsion of agreement. It cites the section 8(d) prohibition as an express
statutory mandate of this theme. The Court agreed with the Board
that industrial peace and stability are goals of national labor policy. It
points out, however, that these goals are not to be purchased at the
price of an employer's freedom of contract.70 In this sense it was felt
the Board failed to heed the admonition of H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB:71
[W]hile the Board does have power.., to require employers and
66. NLRB v. Interstate 65 Corp., 453 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1971); Ranch-Way, Inc. v.
NLRB, 445 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1971); William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 441
F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971). ^
67. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
68. Id. at 281. Burns tacitly approved the Board's successorship doctrine to the extent
that it imposed on a successor employer a duty to bargain with the employees' bargain-
ing representative. The Court therein stated:
• ..where the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees
hired by the new employer are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent
there is little basis for faulting the Board's implementation of the express mandates
of § 8(a)(5) and § 9(a) by ordering the employer to bargain with the incumbent
union.
Id.
69. Id. at 291 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 287.
71. 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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employees to negotiate, it is without power to compel a company
or a union to agree to any substantive contractual provision of a
collective bargaining agreement.72
The Board's reliance on the Wiley decision as authoritative support
for its departure from contract law was found to be improper. The
Court held Wiley not to be controlling because it arose in the con-
text of a section 301 suit which was not limited by the statutory pro-
hibition of section 8(d). It was emphasized that Wiley turned on the
national labor policy favoring the arbitration of industrial disputes and
the opinion in no way warrants the Board's conclusion that an em-
ployer commits an unfair labor practice if he does not honor a prede-
cessor's pre-existing collective bargaining agreement.
73
Finally, the Court concluded the Burns rule may result in serious.
inequities. A successor may be willing to purchase a business that is
doing poorly only if he can make immediate changes. If the Burns
rule is applied such changes would be impossible and two employers,
one who wants "in" and one who wants "out," would be precluded
from changing their positions."4
IV
A reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Burns reveals the
Court paid little attention to the Board's rationale used to avoid the
section 8(d) conflict. The Board emphasized the imposition of a pre-
existing collective bargaining agreement on a successor was distinguish-
able from the practice prohibited by section 8(d). That prohibition
was against construing a section 8(a)(5) bargaining obligation to com-
pel an employer to agree to a proposal or make a concession. In other
words, the Board argued that because the Burns rule was applied only
in situations where there had been agreement to terms and conditions
in the employing industry, the section 8(d) prohibition was not ap-
plicable.7 5
The legislative history of section 8(d) supports the Board's position.
The National Labor Relations Act7 6 (NLRA) was the beginning of
72. 406 U.S. at 283, citing 397 U.S. at 102.
73. 406 U.S. at 285-86.
74. Id. at 287-88.
75. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350.
76. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449. This Act is commonly known as The
Wagner Act.
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modern labor legislation in the United States. It was enacted in 1935
with the belief that industrial strife and unrest would be mitigated if
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining were encouraged.
This encouragement was the basic theme of the NLRA.77 Although
neither section 8(d) nor a similar provision was a part of the NLRA,
Congress made it abundantly clear the government's role was only to
protect the collective bargaining process. The government was not to
become a party to the negotiations. In a report accompanying the
NLRA, the Senate Committee on Education and Labor stated:
The committee wishes to dispel any possible false impression that
this bill is designed to compel the making of agreements or to
permit governmental supervision of their terms. It must be
stressed that the duty to bargain collectively does not carry
with it the duty to reach an agreement, because the essence
of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to de-
termine whether proposals made to it are satisfactory.78
The Labor Management Relations Act of 194779 amended and sup-
plemented the NLRA. One of the amendments was the addition of
subsection (d) to the unfair labor practices of section 8. The purpose
of the amendment was to remedy what Congress thought to be a
glaring weakness of the NLRA. Under the NLRA, an employer com-
mitted an unfair labor practice if he refused "to bargain collectively
with the representative of his employees .... ,,8o Nowhere in the
NLRA, however, was there a standard or guide for the Board to fol-
low when making this unfair labor practice determination. The sub-
section (d) amendment was added for this purpose. The committee
report submitted by Representative Hartley, to accompany what even-
tually became the Taft-Hartley Act emphasized this purpose:
[T]he present Board has gone very far, in the guise of determining
whether or not employers had bargained in good faith, in setting
itself up as the judge of what concessions an employer must make
and of the proposals and counterproposals that he may or may not
take ....
[U]nless Congress writes into the law guides for the Board to
follow, the Board may attempt to carry this process still further
77. See Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449.
78. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970). This Act is commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act.
80. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 8(5), 49 Stat. 453.
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and seek to control more and more the terms of collective bar-
gaining agreements."'
It is clear section 8(d), notwithstanding the policy considerations
favoring industrial peace and stability, was designed to specifically
prevent governmental intervention in the negotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement. Congress did not want the Board to assume a
role by which it imposed the actual terms to an agreement.8 2 This is
not to say, however, that governmental intervention is to be proscribed
after an agreement has been made within an employing industry. On
the contrary, section 8(d) provides for governmental intervention when
an agreement is terminated or modified.8 3 Without question, the Burns
rule involves a problem of Board intervention into the domain of
contractual obligations; but this domain is only invaded after an
agreement in the employing industry has been made and prematurely
terminated. The Board is not mandating to the negotiating parties
what proposals must be agreed upon and what concessions must be
made in order to avoid a failure to bargain charge. In a sense, the
Burns rule is not so much concerned with imposing an agreement
on a successor as it is with promoting the collective bargaining process
by protecting the end product of prior bargaining in an employing
industry. To this extent the Burns rule is distinguishable from the
section 8(d) prohibition.
In Burns, the Court criticized the Board for its failure to heed the
Porter decision. The merit of this criticism is questionable. In Porter
the Court held the Board's remedial power under section 10(c) was
not broad enough to permit it to order an employer, who had bargained
in bad faith during contract negotiations, to agree to a substantive
contractual provision. The section 8(d) prohibition was not found to
be literally applicable because the unfair labor practice was determined
apart from the employer's failure to agree to a proposal or make a
concession. The Court, however, relied upon that section's legislative
81. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1947).
82. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), where the Court evaluated the
legislative history of section 8(d) and concluded that it was an attempt by Congress,
"... to prevent the Board from controlling the settling of the terms of collective bargain-
ing agreements." Id. at 487.
83. The proviso to section 8(d) states:
That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in
an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that
no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract ....
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history as authoritative support for its limitation on the scope of the
Board's remedial power under section 10(c). 8 4
Unlike Burns, the Board in Porter was involved in the initial de-
termination of an agreement's terms and conditions. The Burns rule,
strictly speaking, does not impose terms and conditions to an agree-
ment. Terms and 'conditions had been previously agreed to in the
employing industry. On the surface, this distinction appears to be
superfluous. The distinction does have merit, however, if the section
8(d) prohibition is interpreted in view of its legislative history. In this
sense, the prohibition only refers to the initial making of an agreement.
It was not intended to, nor does it specifically deal with an agreement
already in existence.
The Court in Burns did not agree with the Board's treatment of the
Wiley decision. While it is true that the Wiley holding was narrowly
phrased s5 in the context of a section 301 suit under Title III of the
LMRA, there is language in the opinion which makes the Court's con-
sideration of its value to Board proceedings incomplete. In Wiley,
policy considerations favoring arbitration were relied upon by the
Court to support the conclusion that the arbitration provision of a
pre-existing collective bargaining agreement survived a change of
ownership. 6 The Wiley rationale, however, also encompassed criteria
relevant to Board proceedings involving successorship problems.
The Court in Wiley recognized that employees, and the unions which
represent them, ordinarily do not take part in the negotiations leading
to a change of ownership. National labor policy, therefore, requires
their interest be protected.87 This recognition of the need for employee
protection in a change of ownership situation, and the method by
which it was accomplished in Wiley, was not ignored by the Board
in the formulation of the Burns rule.8 It must, of course, be noted
that Wiley involves private litigants under Title III of the LMRA,
84. 397 U.S. at 107-08.
85. The Court in Wiley held that:
. . . the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into
collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically terminate all
rights of the employees covered by the agreement, and that, in appropriate circum-
stances, present here, the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the
union under the agreement.
376 U.S. at 548.
86. 376 U.S. at 549.
87. Id.
88. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350.
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whereas Board jurisdiction is governed by Title I. The findings and
policies of the LMRA, however, apply equally to both Title I and Title
III. Thus, a statement of national labor policy in a section 301 case 89
is not irrelevant to Board proceedings.
In Burns, the Board paid particular attention to the departure from
contract doctrine in Wiley. The Court in Wiley cited Lincoln Mills90
as authority for the departure. It added, however, that a collective
bargaining agreement "[i]s not an ordinary contract." 91 The peculiar
status and function of a collective bargaining agreement had been
noted earlier by the Court in United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Co. 92 It was there stated:
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties
of the parties. It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code
to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly
anticipate. The collective agreement covers the whole employment
relationship. It calls into being a new common law-the common
law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.9 3
This characterization of a collective bargaining agreement was cited
with approval in Wiley." There seems to be no reason for the Board
not to consider the peculiar status and function of a collective bar-
gaining agreement in a Board proceeding. Its special nature does not
change merely because Title I is involved, rather than Title III of
the LMRA. Once it was recognized in Wiley that a collective bargain-
ing agreement is not an ordinary contract, the Court felt free to bal-
ance policy considerations that outweighed the successor's argument
for the application of contract law. There is nothing in Wiley that
indicates the policy considerations therein applied are the only ones
that can be placed in the balance, or that the courts have a monopoly
on the use of the scale.
The Court in Wiley emphasized that its holding was not to be ap-
plied in every case involving a change of ownership. The scope of the
holding was to be limited to cases in which there existed a substantial
continuity in the business enterprise before and after the change.95
This limitation would be of particular interest to the Board because
89. A section 301 suit, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), is brought under Title III of the LMRA.
90. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
91. 376 U.S. at 550.
92. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
93. Id. at 578-79 (citations omitted).
94. 376 U.S. at 550.
95. Id. at 551.
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it determines both successor status and the obligations resulting there-
from by applying the same test.
The Court's approach to Burns was correct to the extent that it
recognized a problem involving a conflict in national labor policy.
National labor policy espouses freedom of contract. To a certain
-degree, the Burns rule is an intrusion upon this freedom. An equally
:important labor policy is the promotion of industrial peace and stability.
Title I of the LMRA attempts to reach these ends by equalizing the
bargaining power of employees and employers. Equalization of bar-
gaining power is best attained by assuring and guaranteeing the rights
of employees to organize and bargain collectively through their elected
representatives. A major purpose of the section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain
is to make meaningful these fundamental rights. The Burns rule serves
this end by protecting the status of the pre-existing collective bargain-
ing agreement, the end product of previous collective bargaining.
No balance was reached between these conflicting national labor poli-
cies. The Court's disregard of Wiley, its emphasis upon the section
8(d) prohibition, and the Porter case show that only the labor policy of
contractual freedom was considered in the resolution of the conflict
posed by the Burns rule. By failing to put all the weights on the
scale, the conflict was not truly resolved. It is suggested the Court
should not have completely disregarded Wiley. Also, the section 8(d)
prohibition and the Porter case should not have been viewed as neces-
sarily mandating the Court's decision in Burns. If this suggestion would
have been followed, a decision of more precedental value would have
been reached.
In one sense, this criticism of the Court may be mitigated. It can be
argued that the Court, in looking at the equities of the Burns rule,
directly faced the resulting conflict in labor policies. But again, the
Court only looked at the equities from one side of the conflict. Only
the adverse effect on the successor employer's freedom of contract
was considered. 96 A complete appreciation of the conflict would have
included a consideration of the beneficial aspects of the rule. It has
been recognized that there is a direct relationship between industrial
stability and the maintenance of a collective bargaining agreement
previously executed. 97 The Court in Burns totally ignored the effect
96. 406 U.S. at 289-90.
97. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960).
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of removing such an agreement after the change of ownership. Em-
ployee rights, such as seniority and pension benefits, once secured
under a previously negotiated collective bargaining agreement, are
suddenly jeopardized. The Burns rule protects the interests of em-
ployees in a transaction between a buyer and a seller. The protection
of the interests of a third party in a transaction between a buyer and
a seller is not a strange and unique concept 98 and should have merited
consideration by the Court.
Perhaps the Court's rejection of the Burns rule was correct in spite
of the narrow approach used to reach the decision. Even so, the Court's
rationale is significant because of the precedent it creates regarding
the scope of the Board's remedial power under section 10(c). The al-
most total reliance by the Court on the section 8(d) prohibition to
resolve conflicts in national labor policy, when the section is not
specifically applicable, indicates any remedial order directly compell-
ing an unwilling party to agree to a contractual provision will be
seriously questioned. As discussed above, the section 8(d) prohibition
was enacted to specifically limit the Board's application of section
8(a)(5) to the extent that a bargaining obligation was construed to
mean an employer had to agree to a proposal or make a concession
during the negotiation of a contract. The prohibition was not enacted
to resolve conflicts in labor policy resulting from the independent
finding of other unfair labor practices. It has been recognized that:
Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for
administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable
area of the Board's discretion and and must guard against the
danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law
into the more spacious domain of policy.99
The language and approach of the Court to Burns suggests this guard
has been dropped and the slide begun.
98. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 6-101 to 6-111 (1972 version). The purpose of
this legislation is to protect the interests of the creditor to a predecessor entity in a
transaction involving the sale of a business. Duties are imposed on the transferor and
transferee that must be complied with before the transfer is held to be effective as
against any creditor of the transferor. See also 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7121 (1961), wherein it is noted:
In case of merger of one corporation into another, where one of the corporations
ceases to exist and the other corporation continues in existence, the latter corpo-
ration is liable for the debts, contracts and torts of the former, at least to the extent
of the property and assets received, and this liability is often imposed by statute.
99. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
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V
The Supreme Court decision in Burns, to a large extent, eliminated
a successor's concern that it may be acquiring more liabilities than
immediately appear on the face of the purchase agreement. It is clear
from the Court's decision that the Burns rule is now overruled.100
A conclusion that a successor need not concern himself with the con-
tractual obligations of the successorship doctrine, however, may be
a bit premature. Indirect imposition of the predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement may yet be achieved by the surviving remnants
of the Overnite theory.
The Court dealt with the Overnite theory when it disagreed with
the Board's alternative contention that Burns was liable for employee
losses caused by unilateral changes made before bargaining had reached
an impasse. In this respect, the unilateral act of a successor employer
was found to be distinguishable from similar acts of an ordinary em-
ployer. The Supreme Court noted the distinction when it stated:
Although Burns had an obligation to bargain with the union con-
ceming wages and other conditions of employment when the
union requested it to do so, this case is not like a § 8(a)(5) viola-
tion where an employer unilaterally changes a condition of em-
ployment without consulting a bargaining representative. It is
difficult to understand how Bums could be said to have changed
unilaterally any pre-existing term or condition of employment
without bargaining when it had no previous relationship what-
soever to the bargaining unit, and prior to July 1 [date of the
Burns take over of operations], no outstanding terms and condi-
tions of employment from which a change could be inferred. The
terms on which Burns hired employees for service after July 1
may have differed from the terms extended by Wackenhut and
required by the collective-bargaining contract, but it does not
follow that Bums changed its terms and conditions of employ-
ment .... 101
The conclusion that Burns had no outstanding terms and conditions of
employment prior to its starting of operations was an implicit reversal
100. Subsequent to the Court's decision in Burns, the Board has held that the contract
bar doctrine is not applicable to a successor unless the pre-existing collective bargaining
agreement is assumed by it in writing. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 197 N.L.R.B. No.
104, 80 L.R.R.M. 1445 (1972).
101. 406 U.S. at 294.
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of Overnite. There is language in the Burns opinion, however, that
creates doubt as to the extent of the reversal.
The Court decided a successor employer, as a general rule, is free
to set initial terms and conditions of employment without first bar-
gaining with the employees' representative. 102 When it is clear that
the successor plans to retain all the employees in the bargaining unit,
an exception to the general rule is recognized. A successor, in that
case, must first consult with the bargaining representative before initial
terms and conditions can be fixed. 10 While the Court's language is
not completely clear, it can be inferred that no bargaining on initial
terms and conditions is required of the successor employer until the
bargaining obligation has matured. The general rule assumes that a
successor hires his employee complement in a piecemeal fashion. Under
this method of hiring, the bargaining obligation does not mature until
some time after initial terms and conditions have been offered to the
first employees hired. Since the setting of the initial terms and condi-
tions pre-date the maturation of the bargaining obligation, the suc-
cessor does not commit an unfair labor practice. The exception deals
with the situation when initial terms and conditions of employment are
not set until after the maturation date of the bargaining obligation.
In this instance, a successor must first bargain in good faith before
setting such terms and conditions. A failure to bargain results in an
unfair labor practice and it is implied a "make whole" order will is-
sue.10 4 The issuance of a "make whole" order, however, is inconsistent
with the Court's finding that a successor has no terms and conditions
of employment prior to its own initial determination. Thus, in the
limited situation when the exception applies and a successor employer
102. Id.
103. Id. at 295.
104. Id. The Court applies the rules to the facts in Burns:.
... Burns' obligation to bargain with the union did not mature until it had selected
its force of guards late in June. . . .It is true that the wages it paid when it began
protecting the Lockheed plant on July 1 differed from those specified in the Wacken-
hut collective-bargaining agreement, but there is no evidence that Burns ever uni-
laterally changed the terms and conditions of employment it had offered to potential
employees in June after its obligation to bargain with the union became apparent. If
the union had made a request after Burns had completed its hiring and if Burns had
negotiated in good faith and had made offers to the union which the union rejected,
Burns could have unilaterally initiated such proposals as the opening terms and con-
ditions of employment on July 1 without committing an unfair labor practice.
For the Board's application of the general rule and the exception see Hecker Mach., Inc.,
198 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 81 L.R.R.M. 1253 (1972); Howard Johnson Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No.
98, 80 L.R.R.M. 1769 (1972).
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fails to bargain, Overnite is a viable theory that can be used to indirectly
impose contractual obligations.
The lack of clarity in the Court's enunciation of these rules has
caused problems in their application. The Board has concluded it is
not necessary that the successor plan to hire the predecessor's work
force in toto before the exception comes into play. It has extended the
Court's exception to cases where "substantially" the entire employee
complement of the predecessor is taken over before the initial terms
and conditions have been set.105 The extension appears to be valid
since it conforms with the premise upon which the exception was
founded, i.e., maturation of the bargaining obligation before the
initial setting of terms and conditions. There has not been, however,
any indication whether the Board's view in this regard will be sus-
tained.
When the exception applies, it is clear the successor must bargain
with the employees' representative before initial terms and conditions
are set. It is not clear how long this bargaining must continue. The
language used by the Court suggests a successor employer need only
bargain to the point in time it begins operations. If no agreement has
been reached, the successor can then unilaterally set the initial terms
and conditions of employment.10 6 At least one circuit court has taken
a different view. In NLRB v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co.,10 7 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that in such a situation, a fair
reading of Burns required a successor first bargain to impasse before
taking any unilateral action. There is also a difference of opinion as
to the existence of the exception itself. Unlike the Board'08 and the
Seventh Circuit,109 the Sixth Circuit" has interpreted Burns to create
the rule that a successor is free to set initial terms and conditions re-
gardless of maturation. As a result it has held that a successor's uni-
lateral act of changing terms and conditions of employment one month
after the change of ownership, and after the maturation of the bar-
gaining obligation, is permissible because it is merely a setting of
initial terms and conditions."'
105. S-H Food Serv., Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 81 L.R.R.M. 1181, 1182 (1972).
106. See 406 U.S. at 294-95.
107. 81 L.R.R.M. 2244 (7th Cir. 1972).
108. Howard Johnson Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 80 L.R.R.M. 1769 (1972).
109. NLRB v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 2244 (7th Cir. 1972).
110. NLRB v. Wayne Convalescent Center, Inc., 465 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir. 1972).
111. Id.
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It is suggested that further litigation and conflict will result from
the Court's lack of precision in dealing with the Overnite theory. A
clarification by the Supreme Court will be necessary. Until this is
done, a successor's contractual obligation under Title I of the LMRA
will be, notwithstanding the Burns decision, an unsettled area of the
law.
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